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The lightness of a visual surface is its perceived achromatic reﬂectance [Adelson, E. H., (2000). Lightness perception and lightness
illusions. In M. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The new cognitive neuroscience (2nd ed.) (pp. 339–351) Berlin: Springer; Gilchrist, A. (1999). Lightness
perception. In R. W. F. Keil (Ed.), MIT encyclopedia of cognitive science (pp. 471–472). Cambridge: MIT press]. Lightness ranges from
black, through various shades of grey, up to white. Anderson and Winawer [Anderson, B., Winawer, J. (2005). Image segmentation and
lightness perception. Nature, 434, 79–83] suggested that perceptual decomposition of image luminance into multiple sources in diﬀerent
layers (e.g., perceptual transparency) is critical to the their lightness illusions. However, I show that simple perceptual occlusion evoked
by T-junctions will work as well, suggesting that perceptual scission of luminance into multiple layers is unnecessary for such eﬀects. I
argue that the lightness illusions presented by Anderson and Winawer involve fundamentally diﬀerent mechanisms than previously stud-
ied lightness illusions, including those involving perceptual transparency.
 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Adelson (1993, 2000) devised a variety of new lightness
illusions that were stronger than any previously known.
For example, the diamond-shaped targets in Fig. 1a all
have identical image luminances, however the upper dia-
monds appear much lighter than the lower ones. Adelson’s
displays not only produce strong lightness illusions, they
also evoke percepts of transparency, or percepts in which
diﬀerent targets appear to be under diﬀerent levels of illu-
mination. Thus, the upper diamonds in Fig. 1a appear to
lie behind a dark transparent strip, or in a region of dim-
mer illumination than the lower diamonds. It has been sug-
gested that such lightness illusions might be caused, at least
in part, by misapplied lightness constancy mechanisms
adapted to ‘discount’ the eﬀects of transparency/illumina-
tion diﬀerences on retinal image luminance. This would
allow recovery of surface reﬂectance and aid object recog-
nition (since surface reﬂectance is an intrinsic object prop-0042-6989/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.visres.2007.06.004
E-mail address: mka@soton.ac.ukerty that often remains constant over time). Purves and
colleagues have shown similar eﬀects, as well as interac-
tions with color (Lotto & Purves, 1999; Purves, Williams,
Nundy, & Lotto, 2004; Williams, McCoy, & Purves,
1998a, 1998b. Also see Bressan, 2006; Gilchrist et al.,
1999; Logvinenko & Ross, 2005).
More recently, Anderson and Winawer (2005) discov-
ered a new category of lightness illusions that appears to
produce even stronger eﬀects than Adelson’s (e.g.,
Fig. 2). Their displays also evoke percepts of transparent
overlays. However, in contrast to the displays of Adelson
and other previous lightness illusions, the targets in Ander-
son and Winawer’s displays were non-uniform in their
image luminance. Their targets and backgrounds were ran-
dom luminance gradients. The luminance of the targets
usually ranged from roughly 25% to 75%, while the gradi-
ents of the backgrounds ranged roughly either from 0% to
75%, or from 25% to 100%. Anderson and Winawer’s dis-
plays are perceived to contain transparent ‘clouds’ of non-
uniform transmittance overlaying solid-colored surfaces.
Anderson and Winawer’s displays are also diﬀerent
from traditional transparency displays in another
Fig. 1. (a) Adelson’s snake illusion. The upper diamonds appear much
lighter than the lower diamonds, although they are physically identical.
Also the upper diamonds appear to lie behind a dark transparent strip or
in dim illumination and/or the lower diamonds appear to lie behind a light
transparent strip or in bright illumination. (b) When the percept of
transparency/illumination diﬀerences is removed, while leaving the local
contrast unchanged, the illusion becomes very weak, at least in this case.
(after Adelson, 2000).
3062 M.K. Albert / Vision Research 47 (2007) 3061–3069important respect: The perceived transparent clouds could
potentially be seen to have signiﬁcant thickness, as
opposed to the thin transparent ﬁlter percepts generally
evoked by traditional transparency displays. Thus, a tar-
get in Anderson and Winawer’s displays could be per-Fig. 2. (a) Anderson andWinawer’s black and white disks. The 4 disks on the le
those on the right appear white. (b) Anderson and Winawer’s control stimu
transparency and the lightness illusion.
Fig. 3. A modiﬁcation of Anderson and Winawer’s black and white disks. The
been copied and pasted at two additional locations in the image. These addition
too, as long as the contrast polarity along most of the length of their bound
associated with the clouds is generally not necessary. However, a lack of such
targets can create the perception that a target is at a diﬀerent depth within the cl
target pasted on the upper right on the dark side of the display. See text for fceived to be completely behind the transparent clouds,
at some intermediate depth, or perhaps slanted in depth.
This diﬀerence greatly alters the geometric and photomet-
ric constraints that might be expected to hold on the basis
of ecological considerations for the perception of trans-
parency. For example, it might be predicted that continu-
ity of the orientation of the image gradient associated
with the clouds as they cross the boundary of a target
(analogous to the continuity of the direction of the
boundary contour of a transparent surface at the point
where it crosses the boundary contour of a background
surface) would not be required for perceptual transpar-
ency of the clouds, since the target and the background
surfaces might be perceived to be diﬀerent depths within
the clouds, and therefore obscured to diﬀerent degrees
by the clouds. Indeed, Anderson and Winawer’s eﬀects
seem to be relatively insensitive to discontinuities of the
orientations of the gradients along the target boundaries,
as long as the contrast polarity along the boundary is
mostly preserved (See Fig. 3).
When target surfaces and transparent surfaces are not
perceived to be ordered into layers, but as penetratingft are identical to the 4 on the right, yet those on the left appear black while
lus in which the disks have been rotated, eliminating the perception of
rightmost disk of the four in Anderson and Winawer’s original display has
al targets will generally appear to be partly obscured by transparent clouds
aries is in the right direction. Continuity of the direction of the gradient
continuity, or inconsistency with the perceived occlusion of other nearby
ouds than other nearby targets, or that a target is slanted in depth (e.g., the
urther details.).
Fig. 4. Objects penetrating transparent surfaces. (a) The straight edges of the cylinder have higher contrast in the region where they are perceived to be
behind the transparent surface. This directly contradicts Anderson’s (1997) theory about the role of contour contrast discontinuities in perceptual scission.
(b) Here the straight edges of the cylinder reverse contrast polarity between the region where they are perceived to be in front of the transparent surface
and the region where they are perceived to be behind the transparent surface. Thus, contrast-reversing contours are capable of supporting perceptual
transparency, in contrast to the situation with ‘overlay’ transparency (e.g., Figs. 1a and 7a) in which the analogous condition, ‘double-reversing’ X-
junctions, do not support transparency. (c) In each cylinder, the contour on the right side reverses contrast polarity, while the contour on the left side has
higher contrast along the segment where it is perceived to be behind the transparent surface. The transparency percepts in these displays are somewhat less
stable than displays depicting overlay transparency. This is likely due to the fact that interpreting the luminance diﬀerences in an overlay transparency
display as being due to diﬀerences in the reﬂectances of opaque surface regions violates principles of ‘non-accidentalness’. This is not the case for displays
depicting penetration of transparent surfaces, such as those shown here.
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perceptual transparency are very diﬀerent from the case of
transparent ‘overlays’. Anderson (1997) proposed that:
‘‘When two aligned contours undergo a discontinuous
change in the magnitude of contrast, but preserve con-
trast polarity, the lower contrast region is decomposed
into two causal layers.’’ (page 2)
This constraint in invalid when conﬁgurations of
interpenetrating objects are allowed (as when solid
objects are seen as penetrating transparent clouds).
For example, Fig. 4a shows a cylinder penetrating a
transparent surface. Here, aligned contours (the straight
edges of the cylinder) undergo a discontinuous change
in the magnitude of contrast and preserve contrast
polarity, but it is the higher contrast region that is
decomposed into two causal layers. Further, Fig. 4b
shows that decomposition into two causal layers can
also occur when two aligned contours undergo a discon-
tinuous change in the magnitude of contrast but reverse
contrast polarity. Fig. 4c demonstrates these two con-
trast relationships on opposite sides of each of the
two cylinders.
A similar eﬀect can be seen in Fig. 3. Here, one of the
target regions from Fig. 2a has been copied and pasted at
two new locations in the image. Subject to the constraint
that the contrast polarity is maintained along most of the
length of the boundary, the targets will generally appear
to be viewed through transparent clouds without much
restriction on where they are placed. Continuity of the
direction of the luminance gradient along the target
boundary does not appear to be a strong constraint. How-
ever, the new targets may appear to be at diﬀerent depths
within the clouds than the original targets, nearer and/or
slanted in depth. For example, the left side of the new tar-get pasted on the upper right on the dark side of Fig. 3
appears to be nearer and seen though less cloud material
then the other nearby targets. This is because the new tar-
get is very light and has high contrast on its left side, but
the background is very dark in that region, and parts of
two nearby targets from the original display appear to be
almost completely obscured and darkened by that patch
of dark cloud. Thus, the visual system infers that the left
side of the new target must be closer than the obscured
targets in the region of that dark cloud patch. But since
the right side of the new patch is quite dark and its right
edge has relatively low contrast, the new target appears
slanted in depth from left to right, penetrating into the
dark clouds.
The transparency percepts in Fig. 4 are somewhat less
stable than in displays depicting ‘overlay’ transparency
(e.g., as seen in Figs. 1a and 7a). This is likely due to the fact
that interpreting the luminance diﬀerences in an overlay
transparency display as being due to diﬀerences in the reﬂec-
tances of opaque surface regions violates principles of ‘non-
accidentalness’. This is not the case for displays depicting
penetration of transparent surfaces, such as those shown
in Fig. 4. Although, non-accidentalness considerations do
not preclude non-transparent interpretations of Anderson
and Winawer’s displays either (as indicated above), the ten-
dency not to interpret slow achromatic luminance gradients
as reﬂectance changes (e.g., Kingdom, 2003) is likely to be
operative in Fig. 2a, which might explain why the gradients
tend to be perceived as due to either transparent clouds (as
in Fig. 2a) or to shading (as in the rotated, contrast-revers-
ing targets in Fig. 2b), but not paint.
Returning to the lightness eﬀect in Anderson and Wina-
wer’s displays, I suggest that these displays have certain
features that make comparisons between the magnitudes
of their lightness illusions and those in Adelson’s and other
3064 M.K. Albert / Vision Research 47 (2007) 3061–3069similar displays problematic. I argue that the strength of
Anderson and Winawer’s illusions is mainly due to the per-
ception of transparency per se, combined with known light-
ness mechanisms.2. Lightness Illusions from occlusion?
Anderson andWinawer suggested that decomposition of
image luminance intomultiple causal layers (e.g., perceptual
transparency) is critical for the lightness illusions presented
in their paper. However, I suggest that the eﬀects seen in
Anderson and Winawer’s displays may be largely based on
factors that are closely related to those present in simple
occlusion displays, even though occlusion does not involve
layered decomposition of luminance (i.e., perceptual scis-
sion). For example, the disk-shaped targets in Fig. 5a are
identical; they are composed of the same alternating blackFig. 5. (a) Lightness from occlusion. The light-colored disk on the left and
the dark-colored disk on the right are identical disks composed of
alternating black and white stripes. The disk on the left appears to be a
partly occluded white surface, while the disk on the right appears to be a
partly occluded black surface. (b) A control stimulus. The target regions in
(a) have been rotated to eliminate the perception of occlusion. The
lightness illusion is greatly reduced. A small eﬀect due to simultaneous
contrast remains. This is analogous to the stimulus manipulation and the
perceptual eﬀect seen in Fig. 3 of Anderson and Winawer (2005).and white stripes. However, on the left the black stripes
of the target were extended into the grey surround, while
on the right the white stripes of the target were extended.
On the left a white disk is seen against a grey background
with black bars in front, while on the right a black disk is seen
against a grey background with white bars in front. Thus,
just an in Anderson and Winawer’s displays, the target is
seen as white in one case and black in the other, although
both targets (the virtual disks) are identical inhomogeneous
(striped) image regions. The important point is that there is
no layered decompositionof image luminance here, only per-
ceived occlusion. If the ‘lightness illusions’ seen in such
occlusion displays are primarily based on mechanisms simi-
lar to transparency mechanisms related to those involved in
Anderson and Winawer’s illusions, then layered luminance
decomposition may be unnecessary for the kind lightness
illusion presented by Anderson and Winawer. In other
words, if we ignore the non-essential additional consider-
ations introduced by Anderson and Winawer’s use of ran-
dom gradients (see Fig. 7), the occlusion case and the
transparency case are distinguished by the presence of T-
junctions in the former case and X-junctions in the latter.
The T-junctions signalling occlusion can be viewed as the
opaque limiting case as the transparent surface is made less
and less transparent.
The construction of Fig. 5a is completely analogous to
that of Anderson and Winawer’s displays, except that it
uses only three grey-levels instead of hundreds. In Ander-
son and Winawer’s displays, the ‘seed image’ was randomly
generated using a spatial-frequency power spectrum of 1/f2,
and its luminance range was compressed and shifted to
range either between grey and white or between black
and grey in the background region, while the targets were
left to range between black and white. I started with a ‘seed
image’ of alternating black and white stripes, and then
applied exactly the same transformation to produce
Fig. 5a. (A movie version is available as Supplementary
information.) The target regions in Fig. 5b have been
rotated relative to their original orientation, thereby elimi-
nating the perception of occlusion.
More of the surface area of the perceived targets is vis-
ible in Anderson and Winawer’s displays than in Fig. 5a.
Only half of the target area (the virtual disk) is visible in
Fig. 5a. The remainder is perceived to be occluded by the
bars. Thus, it might be suggested that the lightness illusion
in Fig. 5a is more dependent on amodal completion of the
targets behind the occluding stripes than Anderson and
Winawer’s illusions. However, consider the stereoscopic
version of Fig. 5a shown in Fig. 6. The binocular disparity
of the disks is exactly equal to the width of a single stripe.
Thus, the regions of the disks in Fig. 6 that are occluded in
the image presented to one eye are visible to the other eye.
Thus, the visual system doesn’t really have to do any amo-
dal completion of the targets behind the occluding bars in
Fig. 6. Of course, we still perceive a white disk in the upper
stereogram and a black disk in the lower one, even though
both stereograms have identical target regions. Similarly,
Fig. 6. A stereoscopic version of Fig. 5a. A white disk is seen on the top
and a black disk on the bottom. Since the binocular disparity of the disks
is equal to the width of one stripe, all parts of the disks are visible to one or
the other eye, so the visual system need not rely on amodal completion of
the perceived disks behind the occluding stripes to infer their complete-
ness. (Fuse the images by crossing the eyes.)
Fig. 7. (a) A simpliﬁed version of Anderson and Winawer’s display with bipar
Winawer’s displays, except that the transparency is homogeneous and the displ
on the right. (b) The target regions in (a) have been rotated to eliminate the p
sorts of displays are identical to those studied by transparency researchers for m
transparency illusions).
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frames in which the targets are identical in each frame
(although they change from frame to frame). Again, a
white disk is seen on the left, and a black disk is seen on
the right.3. On the relationship between Anderson and Winawer’s
eﬀects and previous work on lightness illusions and
perceptual transparency
Anderson and Winawer’s eﬀects are not fundamentally
new. Similar eﬀects can be seen in most perceptual trans-
parency displays of the sort studied for at least the past
30 years (e.g., Metelli, 1974). The major diﬀerence is that
the transparent layers perceived in Anderson and Wina-
wer’s displays are inhomogeneous (evoked by the slow gra-
dients), whereas the transparent layers perceived the
displays used in most previous studies of perceptual trans-
parency were homogeneous. However, the same sort of
illusions can be readily obtained with perceptually homoge-
neous transparency, as can be seen in Fig. 7. What is new in
Anderson and Winawer (2005) is primarily only the claim
that such eﬀects are lightness illusions.
Assuming that Anderson and Winawer’s eﬀects are
properly considered to be lightness illusions, what makes
them stronger (at least according to Anderson and Wina-
wer’s measurement procedure) than previous lightness illu-
sions involving perceptual transparency, such as those
investigated by Adelson (2000)? One possibility is that once
the visual system has constructed the transparency percept,
it simply has to compare the luminances of the parts of the
targets perceived to be in plain view (see the simpliﬁed ver-
sion of Anderson and Winawer’s displays in Fig. 7). In
other words, in Anderson and Winawer’s displays the
visual system is able to view parts of the two targets undertite target regions. The principle is the same as that behind Anderson and
ay is simple. A light tilted square is seen on the left and a dark tilted square
erception of transparency. The lightness illusion is greatly reduced. These
ore that 30 years, although they did not call them a lightness illusions (only
ab
3066 M.K. Albert / Vision Research 47 (2007) 3061–3069the same perceived conditions of transparency/illumina-
tion, and the targets have very diﬀerent physical lumi-
nances there. In Anderson and Winawer’s displays the
visual system could simply make a veridical luminance
comparison of the darkest part of the dark target to the
lightest part of the light target. (In my occlusion display
the observer might simply compare the parts of the disks
that are perceived as unoccluded.) However, it is very likely
that factors already known to aﬀect lightness perception
are at work in Anderson and Winawer’s eﬀect too. Thus,
the perceived lightness of the darkest and lightest parts of
targets (as computed by a frameworks or image statistics
model) is likely to determine the relative lightness of the
two disks, not their relative luminance.
Even if Anderson and Winawer’s illusions are based on
layered decomposition, there would be no need for the
visual system to make any but the simplest inferences about
the transmittance or reﬂectance of the transparent surfaces.
It would only need to infer that the transparent surfaces are
in the scene (based on X-junctions and related gradient
cues to transparency, see below), and that the targets are
perceived to have the same reﬂectance in the regions that
are seen through the transparent surfaces as in the regions
that are seen in plan view. In Fig. 7, this last inference is
supported by the fact that the two halves of the squares
each have uniform luminance. Thus the only way that
the reﬂectances of the squares in Fig. 7 could be changing
is if (1) they changed coincident with the transparency bor-
der, or (2) the parameters of the transparency and the
reﬂectances of the squares are changing simultaneously
and precisely canceling out each other’s eﬀects on image
luminance in the regions of overlap (since the image lumi-
nances are uniform in the regions of overlap). Both of these
possibilities are unlikely coincidences that are probably not
considered by the visual system. These ‘non-accidentalness’
arguments can be partially extended to Anderson and
Winawer’s gradient displays as well.1 However, the main
reason why the targets in Anderson and Winawer’s dis-
plays are likely to be seen as uniform is because of the ten-
dency not to interpret slow luminance gradients as
reﬂectance changes, since there are no abrupt gradients
inside Anderson and Winawer’s targets.
The visual system could not use either of the above strat-
egies in Adelson’s displays (e.g., Fig. 1). If perceptual trans-
parency and layered decomposition of image luminance
plays a signiﬁcant role in Adelson’s eﬀects, then the visual
system would have to try to discount the eﬀects of the two1 In Anderson and Winawer’s displays, the orientation of the gradient is
continuous across the boundaries the targets. This image structure would
be accidental if there were a slow change in the reﬂectance of the target in
the annular region near its border. Although this reasoning does not
preclude a slow change in the reﬂectance of the target in its interior, it
makes it unlikely if the target’s reﬂectance changes and the position of its
boundary are assumed to be independent. However, as indicated above,
continuity of the orientation of the gradient across the boundaries the
targets is generally not necessary for the transparency and lightness eﬀects
seen in Anderson and Winawer’s gradient displays.perceived transparent surfaces on the image luminances of
the target regions in order to infer what the two targets
would look like under the same viewing conditions, since
the targets are not perceived to be under the same viewing
conditions in any regions of the image. This would clearly
be a much more diﬃcult and error-prone task, requiring a
relatively quantitative computation of the eﬀects of the
transparent surfaces on the image luminances (e.g., com-
puting the reﬂectance and transmittance of both transpar-
ent surfaces). In Anderson and Winawer’s displays no
discounting computation would be necessary once the
visual system had simply qualitatively inferred that the
transparency is present in the scene and that the disks are
uniform. Thus, the apparently greater strength of Ander-
son and Winawer’s illusions might simply be due to observ-
ers’ ability to perceive which image regions are relatively
‘unobscured’ by the clouds, followed by a lightness compu-
tation of the kind that previous researchers have suggested.
Anderson and Winawer’s displays contain features that
would be likely to evoke strong lightness illusions accord-
ing to models based on frameworks (Gilchrist et al.,
1999) or image statistics (Adelson, 2000), since they contain
complex backgrounds containing a large number of diﬀer-
ent grey-levels.
Adelson’s displays give rise to percepts of transparency
and produce lightness illusions that are much stronger than
simple simultaneous contrast. This is consistent with the
possibility that these eﬀects arise partly because the visual
system is trying to discount the inﬂuence of perceived
transparency/illumination diﬀerences to recover back-
ground surface reﬂectance. However, many (but not all)
alterations to Adelson’s displays that disrupt or even abol-
ish the transparency percepts in his displays do not greatly
weaken the lightness illusions (Albert & Finkel, 1996; Bres-
san, 2006; see Fig. 8). In contrast, Anderson and Winawer’s
lightness illusions seem to be greatly weakened by manipu-
lations that disrupt the conscious perception of transpar-ig. 8. (a) Diamond/ellipse display due to Adelson (1993). The diamond
n the left appears lighter than the one on the right, although they are
hysically identical. (b) A variant (Albert & Finkel, 1996) that inhibits
erceptual transparency but does not greatly diminish the lightness
lusion.F
o
p
p
il
M.K. Albert / Vision Research 47 (2007) 3061–3069 3067ency (e.g., Fig. 2b). Thus, transparency mechanisms might
combine with the other lightness factors that operate in
Adelson’s displays and other lightness illusions (e.g., artic-
ulation-like eﬀects due to the gradients) to produce the very
strong eﬀects seen in Anderson and Winawer’s displays.
Moreover, in contrast to Adelson’s displays, Anderson
and Winawer’s target boundaries (and those in Fig. 7a)
contain the very image structure that evokes the perception
of transparency, so their lightness and transparency eﬀects
might be inseparable.
Fig. 9a is a variant of Fig. 5a in which transparent rather
than opaque strips can be seen in front of the disks. How-
ever, it is also possible to see the disks as transparent or as
holes in transparent surrounds. The lack of a similar ambi-
guity in Fig. 2a might be due to the tendency not to inter-
pret slow gradients as reﬂectance changes. Thus, in Fig. 2a
the abrupt edges surrounding the targets must be seen as
reﬂectance edges and the random (mostly low spatial-fre-Fig. 9. (a) A transparent variant of Fig. 5a. (b) When the targets are rotated th
contrast to Fig. 5b). The result is largely the same as in Figs. 5 and 2, suggest
eﬀects.quency) gradients as deﬁning the transparent overlay,
rather than the reverse.
In any case the disk on the left inFig. 9a consistently looks
much lighter than the one on the right, and the illusion is
greatly reduced when the disks are rotated, as in Fig. 9b.
However, in contrast to Fig. 5b the disks in Fig. 9b maintain
consistent contrast polarity all the way around their bound-
aries. As can be seen, the lightness illusion in Fig. 9b is some-
what stronger than the one in Fig. 5b, but at the same time
the lightness illusion in Fig. 9a is much stronger than the
one in Fig. 9b. Thus, consistent contrast polarity is not suﬃ-
cient for the strengthof the illusion seen inFig. 9a, suggesting
that the same may be true for Figs. 5a and 2a.
4. Outline of an algorithm for computing lightness
It might be suggested that Anderson and Winawer’s
eﬀects could be predicted by edge-integration algorithms.ey still maintains consistent contrast polarity all along their boundaries (in
ing that consistent contrast alone is not the main factor in these lightness
3068 M.K. Albert / Vision Research 47 (2007) 3061–3069Edge-integration algorithms for recovering lightness com-
pute the relative lightness between two image patches by
summing the abrupt luminance changes along any path
connecting the two patches, disregarding any gradual lumi-
nance changes. The assumption is that abrupt luminance
edges represent reﬂectance changes between adjacent image
regions and that the ratio of the two luminances is the same
as the ratio of their reﬂectances (if the algorithm is to pro-
duce veridical results), while gradual luminance changes
represent illumination changes and should be ignored when
computing relative lightness. Anderson and Winawer’s dis-
plays contain both abrupt and gradual luminance changes,
however, the gradual luminance changes in their displays
are usually interpreted as changes in the density (transpar-
ency) of clouds in the foreground, rather than as changes in
illumination or shading. In the case of transparency, the
assumption that the ratio of the two luminances across
an abrupt luminance change is the same as the ratio of
the reﬂectances of the background surfaces is not valid,
since the transparent layer can have non-zero reﬂectance
and thereby reduce image contrast. Thus it seems unlikely
that previously proposed edge-integration algorithms could
explain Anderson and Winawer’s eﬀects. Moreover, it has
been has argued that the visual system could not recover
lightness using edge-integration algorithms even when only
illumination changes are considered (e.g., Adelson, 1993,
2000; Gilchrist et al., 1999). One problem is that illumina-
tion edges can be abrupt in 3D scenes, and therefore should
not be included in the sum of abrupt luminance changes
computed during edge integration.
However, since the targets in Anderson and Winawer’s
displays do not contain any abrupt edges there is no need
for the visual system to quantitatively integrate over paths
that cross multiple reﬂectance edges and (somehow) dis-
count the perceived transparency. The system simply needs
to refrain from changing its lightness estimate as the image
luminance slowly varies within the target boundaries. In
other words, since slow luminance gradients tend not to
be interpreted as reﬂectance changes, and there are no
abrupt edges inside the targets, the targets can be inferred
to have uniform reﬂectance. This allows the visual system
to ‘discount’ the eﬀects of the transparency without the
need to quantitatively compute any of the properties of
the transparent clouds (e.g., its transmittance or
reﬂectance).
Thus, I suggest that Anderson and Winawer’s eﬀects are
consistent with the view that the visual system does not
form global reﬂectance and illumination/transparency
maps to compute lightness. The representations used to
make lightness judgments would be constructed using sim-
ple rules such as (1) the highest contrast part of an edge is
perceived to be in ‘plain view’ (Anderson, 2003), and (2)
slow luminance gradients are due to changes in illumina-
tion/transparency rather than to changes in background
reﬂectance.
Speciﬁcally, I propose the following algorithm for com-
puting lightness:1. Compute transparency in the image, e.g., look for polar-
ity preserving contours at X-junctions and their ana-
logues for slow gradients (as in Anderson & Winawer,
2005), and determine which regions are in ‘plain view/
normal illumination’.
2. Run a frameworks (Gilchrist et al., 1999) or image sta-
tistics algorithm (Adelson, 2000), using all image lumi-
nances, to ﬁnd the relative lightness’ of only the
regions perceived to be in plain view, anchoring the
highest luminance to white.
3. Propagate lightness values from the plain-view regions
across all gradients (slow or abrupt) that are perceived
(due to generalized X-junction structure) to be due to
illumination or transparency, but do not propagate
lightness signals across perceived reﬂectance edges. Since
slow luminance gradients tend not to be interpreted as
reﬂectance changes, the algorithm automatically propa-
gates across slow gradients without the need for further
edge classiﬁcation computations.
4. Run a standard 2D frameworks (Gilchrist et al., 1999)
or image statistics (Adelson, 2000) algorithm on the
complete image.
5. Compute the ﬁnal lightness by taking a weighted combi-
nation of the outputs of steps 3 and 4, with the weights
determined by the salience of the scission percept.
Note that this algorithm does not construct a quantita-
tive layered decomposition of the image in the sense that it
does not contain exact values of foreground transmittance
or background reﬂectance at all points in the image (other
than the background reﬂectance values that can be
obtained via the lightness propagation heuristic described
in step 3 above). I suggest that we only use layered repre-
sentations to infer which image regions are background
regions seen in ‘plain view’. Beyond that, we simply use a
frameworks or a image statistics algorithm (step 2 above)
and then propagate the computed lightness values across
perceived illumination/transparency gradients (step 3).
In my Fig. 7a the transparency percept is perhaps less
salient than in Anderson and Winawer’s displays (e.g.,
Fig. 2), so the lightness eﬀect might be weaker (in addition
to the fact that the physical luminances of the target
regions seen in plain view are more similar in Fig. 7a). I
suggest that in Fig. 7a one can use certain viewing strate-
gies to switch between seeing transparency and not (in
varying degrees), and that when transparency is not seen,
or is weak, the ‘weight’ used in step 5 for the output of
the computation in step 3 is correspondingly smaller.
In conclusion, I suggest that Anderson and Winawer’s
eﬀects do not show that the visual system computes layered
decompositions of luminance to compute lightness, or
quantitative layered representations of any kind (e.g.,
quantitative representations of transmittance everywhere
in the image). The fact that Anderson and Winawer’s line
of reasoning further implies that ordinary perceptual occlu-
sion can create massive ‘lightness illusions’ too seems con-
trary to intuition. Moreover, Anderson and Winawer’s
M.K. Albert / Vision Research 47 (2007) 3061–3069 3069eﬀects are, in all relevant respects, identical to those
described by researchers in perceptual transparency going
back at least to Metelli (1974), as illustrated in Fig. 7. This
is in contrast to the lightness illusions (also involving per-
ceptual transparency) previously described by Adelson
(1993, 2000) and others.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.visres.
2007.06.004.
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